This article traces the history of ‘crowding out’, and its use as a justification for austerity and state deflation from its origins in the 1920s to its latest post-2010 incarnation. It examines why governments have kept turning to austerity and continue to justify it on the grounds that public sector activity crowds out more productive private activity, despite the accumulated evidence that this traditional pro-market formulation has failed to deliver its stated goals. It examines three other embedded forms of crowding out that have been highly damaging—leading to weakened social resilience and more fragile economies—but which have been ignored by both governments and mainstream political economists.

THE IDEA OF ‘crowding out’ has long been one of the central canons of pro-market economic theory. The concept was first promoted at an international conference of officials in Brussels in 1920 to discuss ‘sound economic policy’ in the postwar years. Given limited capital, asked the British delegation, will ‘Governments or private industry’ use it more productively? ‘The answer is … private industry’.¹ This argument was then placed at the heart of a strategy of state-imposed austerity through cuts in public spending and wages applied in Britain and other nations in the early 1920s.

Following the short-lived boom at the end of the 1914–18 war, Britain, along with much of Europe, faced growing economic turbulence and surging dole queues, along with high levels of public debt from funding the war. With heightened public expectations of social reform, the coalition government Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, initially promised social reconstruction through higher state spending, especially on homes and schooling. Simultaneously, the Prime Minister faced demands from the owners of capital for a return to the pre-war status quo.

During the war, large chunks of the economy had been taken under state control, with the subordination of private profit to steer resources to the war effort. While the public was calling for a better society in return for the sacrifices of war, business leaders were demanding the dismantling of the heightened state intervention of the war years, lower rather than higher public spending, and the reversal of the strengthened bargaining power labour had enjoyed during the war years. Political and industrial clashes were the inevitable outcome.

Deepening recession and the fear of mounting unrest, fuelled by the shadow of Bolshevism, induced panic among the ruling political and corporate classes. In response, the government dropped its commitment to social renewal in favour of a programme of austerity, or state induced deflation. This involved severe cuts in public spending, including reductions in pay for police, teachers and other public servants—cuts dubbed the ‘Geddes axe’ on the advice of a committee chaired by Sir Eric Geddes, the Minister of Transport.

Economic revival, it was argued, depended on lower spending by the state, lower wages and a return to a balanced budget, with state spending matched by tax revenue. If the state had borrowed more to meet its high-profile postwar pledges on housing and education, it was argued, more efficient and more pro-value private activity would have been ‘crowded out’. The measures, based on the idea of an automatic trade-off between state and private activity, were, it was asserted, simply sound economics based on fundamental laws—and not to be tinkered with—of how the economy worked. These ‘laws’ drew on the doctrines of the early classical economists that free markets and minimal state intervention would bring equilibrium, stability, and optimal growth.

Austerity Britain

Since the 1920s, governments have repeated this strategy of austerity—based on the doctrine of crowding out—on several occasions. These include the early 1930s, the 1970s, the 1980s and the post-2010 decade. Despite the time gaps, these episodes have been marked by almost identical justifications and remarkably similar impacts.

One of the constant themes has been a replay of the balanced budget theory of the 1920s and 1930s. Another has been that public spending cuts and lower wages would release scarce resources for the private sector. In 1975, two Oxford economists, Roger Bacon and Walter Eltis, argued in Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers that Britain’s economic plight stemmed from too many social workers, teachers and civil servants and not enough workers in industry and commerce. Buying into this argument, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, told the House of Commons in 1979, ‘[we need to] roll back the boundaries of the public sector’ in order ‘to leave room for commerce and industry to prosper’.2 In June 2010, launching another rolling programme of spending cuts in his first budget, the Chancellor, George Osborne, repeated this claim that public spending ‘crowds out’ private endeavour.

Again, the presumption was that a more robust economy requires more private and less state activity, along with the counter-intuitive idea that austerity was the route to growth and enterprise. The somewhat crude ‘private sector good, public sector bad’ mantra was widely echoed. ‘The next government is going to have many challenges’, wrote the Times in 2010, ‘but tackling a public sector that has become obese … is going to have to be a priority’.³ Channel 4 went a step further with a programme describing state spending as a ‘Trillion pound horror story’, while The Spectator magazine called it ‘the most important programme to appear on British television this year’.⁴

So, does the austerity/crowding out theory stand up? And if not, why has it been so widely applied? The accumulated evidence shows that it is at best a significant oversimplification of the way economies work. Crowding out of private by too much public sector activity might apply when an economy is operating at full capacity and employment, but the doctrine has only been applied in situations of economic crisis, high unemployment and inadequate demand. Even at full capacity, there is still a choice to be made about the appropriate balance between public and private activity.

Heterodox economists, such as John Hobson in the early twentieth century, had offered an alternative route to growth and out of crisis. His work, which had an important influence on J. M. Keynes, showed that recessions were the product of a shortfall of demand stemming from ‘under-consumption’ and ‘over-production’ triggered in large part by a lack of purchasing power among low- and middle-income households arising from extreme levels of wealth and income inequality.⁵

In the 1920s and early 1930s, slamming on the public spending brakes proved counter-productive. It cut demand and slowed recovery, with private as well as public activity ‘crowded out’. The strategy had minimal effect on improving the state of the public finances, but led to a retreat on social programmes, while unemployment never fell below one million in the inter-war years.

A hundred years on, the Osborne cuts have had a very similar, and predictable impact. They also came with a new label: ‘expansionary austerity’, but an identical message—that a smaller state would generate greater stability via lower interest rates, greater confidence and faster growth. In the event, the strategy turned out to be an additional assault on an already weakened economy, with the cuts in public spending having little or no impact on expanding private activity, while damaging the quality of Britain’s social infrastructure and weakening its system of social support.⁶ One critic, David Blanchflower, a former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, concluded that, by destroying productive capacity and making households worse off, the austerity programme simply ‘crushed the fragile recovery’.⁷ In one estimate, rolling cuts in public spending were said to have shrunk the economy by £100 billion by the end of the decade.⁸ Another study showed that if real-terms growth in public spending at the 3 per cent level inherited in 2010 from the previous Labour government had been maintained and paid for by matching tax rises, Britain’s government debt burden would still have been lowered by 2019.⁹

None of this means that crowding out never occurs. It just takes very different forms from the process advanced in neoliberal thinking. There are three alternative and distinct types of crowding out at work that have consistently had a malign effect on both the economy and wider society, yet have not been systematically addressed in the mainstream economic literature or by relevant government departments.¹⁰ First, the idea that markets know best in nearly all circumstances has shifted the balance between private and public activity too far in favour of the former, thus crowding out the latter. Second, an increasing share of private activity has been geared less to its primary function—to building economic strength and creating new wealth—than to boosting personal corporate rewards in a way which fuels inequality, weakens economies and crowds out economic and social progress. Third, there is the way the return of the ‘luxury capitalism’ of the nineteenth century (triggered by the application of pro-inequality neoliberal policies) has come at the expense of the meeting of essential material and social needs.

The balance between private and public activity

The simple notion—private good, public bad—has long been overplayed by neoliberal theorists. Both have a role to play and the real issue is getting the right balance between the two. State spending plays a crucial role not just in meeting wider social goals, but in supporting economic dynamism and stability. Private corporations do not operate in a vacuum. The profits they make, the dividends they pay and the rewards received by executives stem from a too-often unacknowledged interdependence with wider society, including the state. Business provides jobs and livelihoods, while responding to consumer demand. Society provides the workforce, education, transport, multiple forms of inherited infrastructure and often substantial state subsidies.

History shows that while bad decisions are too common, carefully constructed and evidence-based state intervention can have a highly positive impact. Government responsibility lies in helping to shape markets, prevent market abuse, support innovation, share the burden of risk-taking in the development of new technologies, promote public and private wealth creation and protect citizens. It is now time to ask if these functions—from market regulation to citizen protection—have been underplayed.

Britain is a heavily privatised and weakly regulated economy. Among affluent nations, it has a comparatively low level of public spending, including social spending and public investment in infrastructure, relative to the size of the economy.¹¹ A relatively low portion of the economy is publicly owned.¹² With the cut-price sell-off of state assets, from land to state-owned enterprises, the share of the national wealth pool held in common has fallen sharply from a third in the 1970s to less than a tenth today. This ongoing privatisation process has also greatly weakened the public finances. Britain is one of only a handful of rich nations with a deficit on their public finance balance sheet, with net public wealth—public assets minus debt—now at minus 20 per cent of the economy. The balance stood at plus 40 per cent in 1970. This shift has greatly weakened the state’s capacity to handle issues like inequality, social reconstruction and the climate crisis.¹³

The emphasis on private capital as the primary engine of the economy has failed to deliver the gains promised by its advocates. Since the counter-revolution against postwar social democracy from the early 1980s, and especially since 2010, levels of private investment, research and development, and productivity—key determinants of economic strength—have been low both historically and compared with other rich countries. Several factors account for Britain’s relative private ‘investment deficit’. They include Britain’s low wage history, with abundant cheap labour dulling the incentive to invest, and the perverse system of financial incentives that makes it more attractive for executives to line their pockets than build for the future. There is also the preference given to capital owners—an increasingly narrow group—in the distribution of the gains from corporate activity. In the four years from 2014, FTSE 100 companies generated net profits of £551 billion and returned £442 billion of this to shareholders in share buy-backs and dividends, leaving only a small portion of these gains to be used for private investment and improved wages that support economic strength.¹⁴ With UK corporations increasingly owned by overseas institutional investors, such as US asset management firms, little of this profit flow has ended up in UK pension and insurance funds and back into the domestic economy.

Some forms of financial and business activity have played a destructive role. In a remarkable parallel with the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression, the 2008 financial crash and the financial crisis that followed were classic examples of the impact of uncontrolled market failure. They were the product of tepid regulation of the financial system that turned a blind eye to a lethal cocktail of excessive profiteering and reckless gambling by global finance. It was only public intervention on a mass scale to bail out the banks—and many of the architects of the crash—that prevented an even greater crisis.

Claims about the overriding benefits of the outsourcing of public services to private companies have been exposed by a succession of scandals involving large British companies like G4S and Serco and by damning reports of the consequences of outsourcing in the NHS, the probation service and army recruitment.¹⁵ Such claims were also undermined by the collapse of two giant multi-billion-pound behemoths—the UK construction company Carillion and the public service supplier Interserve (which employed 45,000 people in areas from hospital cleaning to school meals). In the ten years to 2016, Carillion, sunk by self-serving executive behaviour and mismanagement, liked to boast about another malign form of crowding out—of how it raised dividend payments to shareholders every year, with such payments absorbing most of the annual cash generation, rather than building resilience.

Extraction

A second form of crowding out stems from the return of a range of extractive business mechanisms aimed at capturing a disproportionate share of the gains from economic activity. While some of today’s towering personal fortunes are a reward for value-creating activity that brings wider benefits for society as a whole, many are the product of a carefully manipulated, and largely covert, transfer of existing (and some new) wealth upwards. Early economists, such as the influential Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, warned—in 1896—of the distinction between ‘the production or transformation of economic goods’ and ‘the appropriation of goods produced by others.’¹⁶ Such ‘appropriation’ or ‘extraction’ benefits capital owners and managers—those who ‘have’ rather than ‘do’—and crowds out activity that could yield more productive and social value. It delivers excessive rewards to owners and executives at the expense of others, from ordinary workers and local communities to small businesses and taxpayers.¹⁷

Extraction has been a key driver of Britain’s low wage, low productivity and growth sapping economy. Many large companies have been turned into cash cows for executives and shareholders. A key source of this process has been the return of anti-competitive devices described as ‘market sabotage’ by the American heterodox economist Thorstein Veblen over a century ago’.¹⁸ In contrast to the claims of pro-market thinkers, corporate attempts to undermine competitive forces have been an enduring feature in capitalism’s history, contributing to erratic business performance and economic turbulence.

Far from the competitive market models of economic textbooks, the British—and global—economy is dominated by giant, supranational companies. Key markets—from supermarkets, energy supply and housebuilding, to banking, accountancy and pharmaceuticals—are controlled by a handful of ‘too big to fail’ firms. The oligopolistic economies created in recent decades are, despite the claims of neoliberal theorists, a certain route, as predicted by many distinguished economists, from the Polish economist Michal Kalecki, to the Cambridge theorist, Joan Robinson, to weakened competition, extraction and abnormally high profit. This new monopoly power, according to one study of the US economy, has been a key determinant of ‘the declining labor share; rising profit share; rising income and wealth inequalities; and rising household sector leverage, and associated financial instability.’¹⁹

Although they helped pioneer popular and important innovations, the founders of today’s monolithic technology companies have turned themselves from original ‘makers’ into ‘takers’ and ‘predators’. Companies like Google and Amazon have entrenched their market power by destroying rivals and hoovering up smaller competitors, a form of private-on-private crowding out of small by more powerful firms. Multi-billionaires in large part because of immense global monopoly power, the Google, Amazon and Facebook founders can be seen as the modern day equivalents of the American monopolies created by the ‘robber barons’ such as J. D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and Jay Gould through the crushing of competitors at the end of the nineteenth century.

The House of Have and the House of Want

The third type of crowding out follows from the way the growth of extreme opulence for the few has too often been bought, in effect, at the expense of wider wellbeing and access to basic essentials for the many. Today’s tearaway fortunes are less the product of an historic leap in entrepreneurialism and new wealth creation than of the accretion of economic power and elite control over scarce resources. It is a paradox of contemporary capitalism that as societies get more prosperous, many fail to ensure the most basic of needs are fully met.

In Britain, elements of the social progress of the past are, for a growing proportion of society, being reversed. Compared with the 1970s, a decade when inequality and poverty levels were at an historic low, poverty rates have more or less doubled, while both income and wealth have become increasingly concentrated at the top. Housing opportunities for many have shrunk and life expectancy rates have been falling for those in the most deprived areas. Mass, but hit and miss, charitable help has stepped in to help fill a small part of the growing gaps in the state’s social responsibilities. While Britain’s poorest families have faced static or sinking living standards, the limits to the lifestyle choices of the rich are constantly being raised. The private jet, the luxury yacht, the staff, even the private island, are today the norm for the modern tycoon.

In heavily marketised economies with high levels of income and wealth concentration, the demands of the wealthy will outbid the needs of those on lower incomes. More than one hundred years ago, the Italian-born radical journalist and future British MP, Leo Chiozza Money, had warned, in his influential book, Riches and Poverty, that ‘ill-distribution’ encourages ‘non-productive occupations and trades of luxury, with a marked effect upon national productive powers.’²⁰ The ‘great widening’ of the last four decades has, as in the nineteenth century, turned Britain (and other high inequality nations such as the US) into a nation of ‘luxury capitalism’. The pattern of economic activity has been skewed by a super-rich class with resources deflected to meeting their heightened demands.

While Britain’s poorest families lack the income necessary to pay for the most basic of living standards, demand for superyachts continues to rise. The UK is one of the highest users of private jets, contributing a fifth of related emissions across Europe. The French luxury goods conglomerate, LVMH—Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy—is the first European mega-company to be worth more than $500 billion. Resources are also increasingly directed into often highly lucrative economic activity that protects and secures the assets of the mega-rich. Examples include the hiring of ‘reputation professionals’ paid to protect the errant rich and famous, the use of over-restrictive copyright laws, new ways of overseeing and micromanaging workers, as well as a massive corporate lobbying machine.

The distributional consequences of an over-emphasis on market transactions is starkly illustrated in the case of the market for housing. Here, a toxic mix of extreme wealth and an overwhelmingly private market has brought outsized profits for developers and housebuilders at the cost of a decline in the level of home ownership, a lack of social housing and unaffordable private rents. The pattern of housebuilding is now determined by the power of the industry and the preferences of the most affluent and rich. Following the steady withdrawal of state intervention in housing from the 1980s—with local councils instructed by ministers to stop building homes—housebuilders and developers have sat on landbanks and consistently failed to meet the social housing targets laid down in planning permission. Instead of boosting the supply of affordable social housing, scarce land and building resources have been steered to multi-million-pound super-luxury flats, town houses and mansions. In London, Manchester and Birmingham, giant cranes deliver top end sky-high residential blocks, mostly bought by speculative overseas buyers and left empty. The richest crowd out the poorest, or as Leonard Cohen put it, ‘The poor stay poor, the rich get rich. That’s how it goes, everybody knows.’

There has been no lack of warnings of the negative economic and social impact of economies heavily geared to luxury consumption, most of them ignored. Examples include the risk of the coexistence of stark poverty and extreme wealth: of what the radical Liberal MP, Charles Masterman, called, in 1913 ‘public penury and private ostentation’, and what the American radical political economist Henry George had earlier called ‘The House of Have and the House of Want’.²¹ Then there was the influential 1950s’ warning from the American economist, J. K. Galbraith, of ‘private affluence and public squalor’.²² ‘So long as material privation is widespread’, wrote the economist, Fred Hirsch, in the 1970s, ‘the conquest of material scarcity is the dominant concern.’²³

For much of the last century, policy makers have seen wealth and poverty as separate, independent conditions. But that view has always been a convenient political mistruth. If poverty has nothing to do with what is happening at the top, the issue of inequality can be quietly ignored. Yet, the scale of the social divide and the life chances of large sections of society are ultimately the outcome of the conflict over the spoils of economic activity and of the interplay between governments, societal pressure and how rich elites—from land, property and private equity tycoons to city financiers, oil barons and monopolists—exercise their power. In recent decades, the outcome of these forces has favoured the already wealthy, with the shrinking of the economic pie secured by the poorest. As the eminent historian and Christian Socialist, R. H. Tawney, declared in 1913, ‘What thoughtful people call the problem of poverty, thoughtful poor people call with equal justice, a problem of riches.²⁴

Conclusion

These three alternative forms of crowding out have imposed sustained harm on social and economic resilience. Despite this, governments have continued to apply a long-discredited austerity-based theory of crowding out, while ignoring other, arguably more damaging forms of the phenomena. The latest application of the original theory since 2010 has inflicted ‘vast damage on public services and the public sector workforce’, without delivering the declared goal of ‘crowding in’ through faster recovery and growth, or improved public finances.²⁵

Britain is currently being subjected to yet another wave of austerity, with the 2022 Autumn Statement announcing a new package of projected public spending plans, higher taxes and lower public sector real wages, again in the name of fixing the public finances and boosting growth.²⁶ It’s the same short-term, narrowly focussed strategy that, by digging the economy into a deeper hole and cutting public investment, has failed time and again over the last 100 years.

Meanwhile, other damaging forms of the crowding out of key public services, value-adding economic activity and the meeting of vital needs, driven by over-reliance on markets, excess inequality and dubious private-on-private activity, are simply ignored or dismissed.

Notes

¹ C. E. Mattei, The Capital Order, Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 2022, p. 156. ² House of Commons, Hansard, 12 June 1979, col 246. ³ J. Tomlinson, ‘Crowding out’, History and Policy, 5 December, 2010; https://www.historyandpolicy.org/opinion-articles/articles/crowding-out⁴ J. Delingploe, ‘Britain’s trillion pound horror story’, The Spectator, 13 November, 2010. ⁵ J. A. Hobson, The Industrial System, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. ⁶ C. Breuer, ‘Expansionary austerity and reverse causality: a critique of the conventional approach’, New York, Institute for New Economic Thinking, Working Paper no. 98, July 2019. ⁷ D. Blanchflower, Not Working, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2019, p. 172. ⁸ A. Stirling, ‘Austerity is subduing UK economy by more than £3,600 per household this year’, New Economics Foundation, 2019; https://neweconomics.org/2019/02/austerity-is-subduing-uk-economy-by-more-than-3-600-per-household-this-year⁹ R. C. Jump, J. Michell, J. Meadway and N. Nascimento, The Macroeconomics of Austerity, Progressive Economy Forum, March 2023; https://progressiveeconomyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/pef_23_macroeconomics_of_austerity.pdf¹⁰ See S. Lansley, The Richer, The Poorer, How Britain Enriched the Few and Failed the Poor, Bristol, Policy Press, 2022. ¹¹ K. Buchholtz, Where Social Spending is Highest and Lowest, Statistica, 28 January, 2021; https://www.statista.com/chart/24050/social-spending-by-country/¹² OECD, The Covid-19 Crisis and State Ownership in the Economy, Paris, OECD, 2021; https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-covid-19-crisis-and-state-ownership-in-the-economy-issues-and-policy-considerations-ce417c46/¹³ L. Chancel, World Inequality Report, World Inequality Database, 2021. ¹⁴ High Pay Centre/TUC, How the Shareholder-first Model Contributes to Poverty, Inequality and Climate Change, TUC, 2019. ¹⁵ National Audit Office, ‘Transforming Rehabilitation: Progress Review’, National Audit Office, 1 March 2019; https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/transforming-rehabilitation-progress-review/¹⁶ V. Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1896. ¹⁷ Lansley, The Richer, The Poorer. ¹⁸ T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisured Classes, New York, The Modern Library, 1899; T. Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1921. ¹⁹ I. Cairo and J. Sim, Market Power, Inequality and Financial Instability, Washington DC, Federal Reserve, 2020. ²⁰ L. Chiozza Money, Riches and Poverty, London, Methuen, 1905, pp. 41–3. ²¹ C. Masterman, The Condition of England, Madrid, Hardpress Publishing, 2013; H. George, Progress and Poverty, New York, Cosimo Inc., 2006, p. 12. ²² J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1958, ch. 23. ²³ F. Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth, Abingdon, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 190. ²⁴ R. H. Tawney, ‘Poverty as an industrial problem’, inaugural lecture at the LSE, reproduced in Memoranda on the Problems of Poverty, London, William Morris Press, 1913. ²⁵ V. Chick, A. Pettifor and G. Tily, The Economic Consequences of Mr Osborne: Fiscal Consolidation: Lessons from a Century of UK Macroeconomic Statistics, London, Prime, 2016; G. Tily, ‘From the doom loop to an economy for work not wealth’, TUC, February, 2023; https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/doom-loop-economy-work-not-wealth²⁶ Chancellor of the Exchequer, Autumn Statement, 2022, Gov.uk, 17 November, 2022; https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/autumn-statement-2022

This article was first published in The Political Quarterly 

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Biography

• Stewart Lansley is the author of The Richer, The Poorer: How Britain Enriched the Few and Failed the Poor, a 200-year History, 2021. He is a visiting fellow at the University of Bristol and an Elected Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences.

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“… weapons producers want governments to underwrite the profitability of their investments. This is precisely the alliance between industry and the state that formed the basis of the military Keynesianism that Michal Kalecki criticized during the 1950s. He showed how, at the height of the Cold War, Western governments subsidized private capital with arms contracts paid for by taxpayers.”

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Overshadowed by the appalling news from Ukraine, Chancellor Rishi Sunak presented the annual Mais Lecture in London a couple of weeks ago. Traditionally used by Chancellors (and, sometimes, Shadow Chancellors) as a space to fill out the detail of their economic plans, and (they hope) give the impression of some depth of thought behind them, this was, as other commentators have pointed, out a comparatively rare insight into Sunak’s mind a few weeks of what will be, for him, another Spring Statement severely rattled by external events.

Battered by the pandemic, and subject to the whims of a once all-powerful Prime Minister, Sunak has spent two years in office cranking up government spending whilst offering variations of St Augustine’s prayer: “Lord, make me fiscally conservative, but not yet!” Mais Lecture was no different in this respect, once again promising the faithful that he would soon, very soon, start cutting taxes.

And of course you have to read the whole thing through a potential Conservative Party leadership battle. It helps to read British politics in general through the prism of a never-ending Tory leadership contest: like other semi-democracies, squabbles amongst factions in the ruling party matter far more than debates between the ruling party and the tolerated opposition – whatever the likelihood of any actual changes at the top.

But with Liz Truss letting her Tory MMT tendencies be known early on, judiciously making sure news of her indifference to deficits was leaked to the Times just ahead of Tory Party Conference last year, Sunak had to establish some clear blue water on the question of spending. Truss wants to cut taxes, regardless of the impact on government borrowing. Sunak “firmly believes” in low taxes but is “disheartened… by the flippant claim” that taxes pay for themselves. Tut tut. Once again, low taxes, but not yet.

What’s more striking is, as per usual, what Sunak doesn’t talk about. For a decade Tories noisily insisted that the government debt and the government’s deficit were the most important problem in the world, and that all other government spending could be sacrificed to shrinking both. Former Chancellor George Osborne used his own Mais Lecture to spell out the argument for immediate action on government spending, back in 2010. Osborne offered a cogent and closely-argued case for finding the poorest and most vulnerable in society and fiscally waterboarding them for a decade.

Never mind that the gurus he cited, Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, turned out to have made a spreadsheet error in their calculations on the impact of government debt on growth which rendered their most eye-catching claims useless. And never mind, too, that by the time he left office, Osborne had overseen the longest decline in living standards since the dawn of industrial capitalism, even as the government debt burden continued to rise. What matters here is the intellectual framing of the discussion around the role of government in the economy as entirely negative: that government, with its shocking debts and yawning deficits, was little more than a deadweight on a long-suffering private sector, yearning to be free.  Aided and abetted by a compliant media, who didn’t know better, and the Institute of Fiscal Studies, who should’ve known better, the economic illiteracy of the story mattered less than its political purpose in justifying the reshaping of the British economy back around the interests of its financial system in the years after the 2008 crisis.

So tightly were austerity’s mind-forged manacles that it took the triple shock of Brexit, Jeremy Corbyn and covid to break them. Brexit gave us a Tory Prime Minister who wanted to talk about the “burning injustices” of the economy. Corbyn, in turbulent years after the 2017 election, gave us a different Tory Prime Minister who consistently increased spending. And covid has given us a Tory Chancellor who scarcely references the government debt.

The contrast between Osborne and Sunak, then, is stark. The current Chancellor reflects a new consensus, apparent across the business press in recent months, that government spending in the future is going to be higher: on (his words) “health, pensions and social care” for an ageing population; on the “legacy of covid” in annual vaccination programmes, antivirals, and testing; on education; on government infrastructure investment, praised by Sunak; and of course on the military, where demands have been raised for a 25% increase in the current budget.

This isn’t the austerity economics of the 2010s. It is a higher-spending, bigger-state Toryism that means, come 2024, the difference between the two main parties’ spending plans – widening in elections 2015 onwards – is likely to be substantially reduced. Reduced, too, will be their rhetoric on the fundamentals of the economy: both accept a significantly increased role for government investment, including on renewable energy; both accept the need for  intervention in the economy to address inequality, beyond using the tax system alone (aka “Levelling Up”); both accept the idea that intervention can address the productivity problem. And both have decided to foreground economic growth as the key to a successful economy.

Market morality

It’s here that Sunak gets interesting, once we get past the boil-in-a-bag Treasury policy prescriptions for growth. Sunak wants to cut taxes on investment by businesses, invest more in “adult skills”, and spend more on R&D – so far, so familiar, although Sunak at least throws in the possibility of scooping up “entrepreneurs and highly skilled people” from all over the world, post-Brexit.

Instead it is when Sunak tells us about his desire to create a “new culture of enterprise” that we should be paying more attention. Sunak’s carefully-curated public image has been of a man somewhat wary of big ideas and book-reading (“all my favourite books are fiction”), but it is to Adam Smith he turns to make the link between culture and economic growth: not via the Wealth of Nations, but its forerunner, the Theory of Moral Sentiments: that a free market not only ensures outcomes that are economically efficient, but that markets themselves are grounded in morality, Sunak here referencing the late Jonathan Sacks’ own Mais Lecture. The process of market interaction itself (says Sunak) shapes morals and therefore culture. “Moral responsibility,” he claims “can only come from being exposed to the consequences – whether good or bad – of our own actions.”

This isn’t a conventional, libertarian-inclined defence of the free market, often associated with the Wealth of Nations, in which freely-transacting individuals are magically guided by the “invisible hand” to produce the best possible outcome for society. This “invisible hand”makes no claims about the morality of your choices, simply that everyone’s preferences will be met best if we allow it do work its mysterious magic. Sunak says this is reading Smith wrong: “Smiths account of the market economy, is not as some have suggested a values free construct which rationalised social choice.”

But this argument for market morality is also not quite that of Sacks’ original Mais lecture, which was a slightly more conventional take on how free markets, desirable as they for producing economic growth and productive cooperation, also require stable social institutions: family, religious organisations, community groups, and so on. We get on with our social interactions, the market sorts out that section of them we call the economy, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number is ensured. We learn our morals and “habits of cooperation” in “the domain of families, congregations, communities, neighbourhood groups and voluntary organisations”.

The invisible hand of Sunak, on the other hand, has a decidedly morally interventionist streak. We will have better moral characters if we allow a market-type process of rewards and punishments to shape them, facing the “consequences… of our own actions”. Happily, the shaping of our characters in turn shapes a culture which then creates the conditions for economic growth through the “universal and laudable desire to better the condition of ourselves and those we love”. A free market fosters an “enterprise culture” which will, in turn, make Britain more receptive to economic growth delivered by a succession of terrific new technologies, lead by Artificial Intelligence (as always).

Note the firm limits to “laudable” bettering here, and what it should be aiming for; and whilst Sunak identifies the need for government to provide some minimum level of support where needed, the boundaries for government action are constrained. Whereas Sacks suggests that economic growth, engendered by the free market, is just one part of a what makes a good society, and that this culture provides the necessary foundations of the market, Sunak’s rather darker argument is that the desirable culture is one that produces growth, and that market outcomes themselves are crucial to shaping that culture.

Sunak may talk up economic growth. He suggests he is an optimist on its future. But if the growth pessimists he cites are right, we left with only the moral claims. What he establishes here looks more like the moral and intellectual framework for a low-growth and significantly more authoritarian version of capitalism.

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On the economic front, this period saw the theories of John Maynard Keynes provide the sound intellectual framework for the views which trade unionists had always instinctively known to be right.

Trades Union Congress, The History of the T.U.C. 1868-1968, p. 85

The bond between Keynes and workers – obvious to trades unionists in 1968 – is obscured in the latest commentary on working hours by Keynes’s own biographer, Lord Skidelsky.

As the pandemic eases, Lord Skidelsky on 17 February warned Daily Mail readers that it was “deluded to think that working from home and a four-day week is anything other than a looming disaster for the UK.” Twice he appeared to condemn “Labour leaders [that] have long advocated a world where their members work fewer hours for more money”.

Er, yes. And – up to a point – workers have been incredibly successful.

The available data (shown on the charts here) suggest that real wages advanced decisively from around the beginning of the nineteenth century. And, likewise, hours have fallen continuously from roughly the same point. Henry Pelling, the author of A History of British Trade Unionism (1963, p. 24), reckons this is the point at which trade unions became a force to be reckoned with: “The extent and efficacy of combinations in the later eighteenth century” he observes, “provoked the active hostility of parliament”. By 1833 the ‘Factory Acts’ began gradually to restrict working hours. Even Karl Marx, no great believer in the reforming virtues of the bourgeois state,[1] celebrated the “legally limited working day, which at lasts makes clear ‘when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins’. Quantum mutatus ab illo [What a great change from that time, from Virgil’s Aeneid]” (Marx, 1976, p. 416).

But Lord Skidelsky only judges trends in hours against Keynes’s prediction that ‘our grandchildren’ might enjoy working only a 15-hour week.  He thus sidesteps the still profound achievements that have so far been made. Moreover, his reasoning here is important. Keynes may have anticipated increasing automation (so permitting more efficient production), but Skidelsky argues he failed to anticipate the insatiable demand for goods and services on the part of workers (meaning more production necessary overall). With the latter meaning upward pressure on hours, Keynes’s idea of a 15-hour week was, sadly, wrong.

However, it doesn’t therefore follow that those who advocate reduced hours today, have, in Lord Skidelsky’s words, a “dismal understanding of economics”. Apparently ignorant of the insatiable appetite of their members for more work and more consumption, union leaders are alleged to reason simplistically as follows:

The demands of trade union leaders for a four-day week are still rooted in the idea of work-sharing. In their eyes, the labour force should be spread as widely as possible to ensure there is no unemployment. Each worker ‘needs’ a job, so by cutting the number of working hours, the number of jobs increases.

In effect Lord Skidelsky is arguing that trade unions adhere to the lump of labour/wage fund fallacy, which can be traced back to at least Ricardo in 1815. Nor is he the first to do so: Sidney and Beatrice Webb claimed likewise from their ivory tower at the London School of Economics. This is the belief that the quantity of work and wages represent nothing more than the total capital of society divided by the population, and takes no account of the complex dynamism of capital itself.

As the economic historian R.V. Clemens pointed out as long ago as 1961, the accusation is unfair to trade uinon leaders: “[a]s for the wage fund theory, union leaders never accepted it in any significant sense, since it was shattered by practically everything they did”.

Ironically Lord Skidelsky’s argument simply modifies the lump/fund fallacies, with technology and taste allowed to change the size of the lump/fund over time. If the workers want ‘indoor toilets’ or more than ‘two sets of clothes’, Lord Skidelsky asserts they will have to work more, not less, because there is only so much capital to go around.

Keynes’ alternative

Keynes’s approach was very different. In the General Theory he took these factors as ‘given’ and not relevant to the argument he was making (“we take as given the existing skill and quantity of available labour, the existing quality and quantity of the available equipment … the tastes and habits of the consumer …”, p. 245). He showed that increasing aggregate demand would lead to a permanently stronger economy. His primary focus was releasing previously contained (and disrupted) aggregate demand through a lower long-term rate of interest, a point I was at pains to make in Keynes Betrayed.

In contrast, the so-called ‘Keynesian’ economists who took his work forwards after the Second World War, have tended instead to focus exclusively on the role of government expenditure. The labour movement (and many ‘post-Keynesian’ economists today, e.g. Stockhammer and Lavoie, 2013) have given more emphasis to the role of higher pay in stimulating aggregate demand. ‘Wage-led growth’ is a critical priority for the Trades Unions Advisory Committee to the OECD – see the report ‘Framing the Recovery: Pathways for a World in Transition’ submitted and presented to the OECD liaison Committee in February 2022. Today ‘wage-led growth’ is a critical priority for the Trades Unions Advisory Committee to the OECD.[2]

Trade union leaders have, since the movement began, understood the basic macroeconomic truth that higher pay will not only be better for workers but better for the economy. And as we have always argued – for example most recently in A future that works for working people – reduced hours are then an additional way to share that increased prosperity. As the charts show, so it has proved in practice.

It is all too easy to revert to the orthodoxy of the industrial revolution, that somehow technology alone set us on the trajectory to today’s prosperity. And even ‘Keynesian’ economists impose the same underlying scenario on their gravely diminished Keynes.

But Keynes’s theory and the view from the labour movement tells us that causality is the other way around. Advanced technology hasn’t created more prosperity, more prosperity has advanced technology!

Slowly improving labour conditions and some rebalancing away from wealth meant a greatly advantaged economy, and set in motion a virtuous cycle of higher pay, more consumption, increased activity, improved technology and lower hours. The consumption was not insatiable, it just reflected what an economy operating less badly could deliver. Workers do not demand unending and unlimited consumption, they demand what they have always demanded – their fair share of what they themselves produce. 

Keynes’ idealism against the struggle for power

Keynes’s 15-hour prediction is of greater interest from the point of view of his failure to influence policy.  As his more streetwise colleague Joan Robinson put it:

The great trouble with Keynes was that he was an idealist. He thought that when people could understand his theory, could understand how the capitalistic system actually works, they would behave in a reasonable manner and operate the system in such a way as to produce favourable results, to produce in particular a high and stable level of employment.

Kahn, 1984, pp. 203-4

For some decades after the Second World War policy was closest to – but still a good distance from –Keynes’s and Labour’s ideal; from the 1980s, as we all know, Thatcher and Reagan led the charge in reversing Labour’s advance. This, as we also know, was not a question of rational economics, but a struggle for power between competing interests.

Incidentally, if we project hours to 2021 at the pace of improvement over 1945 to 1975 then by 2021 a 20-hour week would now be the norm.

Lord Skidelsky not only does not discuss the long-term trend, but also neglects to mention what happened in the most recent decade. In a unique and disastrous departure from a two-century old trajectory, both real pay declined and hours rose. The likely explanation is that people have had to work more hours because pay has for the first decade gone into reverse. Skidelsky’s argument does not account for this change.

We should regard this reversal as indicative of the end point of the decisive restoration of the dominance of wealth over labour and, with it, the diminishing influence of any sane economics. Further: any perceptions around the impact of the pandemic must be tempered by the understanding that COVID19 ensured that wealth enjoyed even greater gains.

Three cheers to those who have secured reductions in the working week for unchanged pay.  However it remains unlikely that the majority of the workers in an economy with 14 million children in poverty will be able to duck out of the labour force very easily – let alone enjoy the comfort of an en-suite bathroom. The existence of zero hours’ contracts simply tells us how far down the road to casualisation we have travelled and the sooner they are banned the better. Workers on these exploitative contracts do not ‘want to work more’ as Skidelsky claims, they want to be paid properly and to enjoy the security their parents’ generation took for granted.

We have been grateful for Lord Skidelsky’s dogged campaigning against austerity policies for the past 13 years. But, as trade union leaders of the past understood, the common ground between Keynes and the Labour movement goes much deeper. The need is to begin again to construct an economy that puts workers in front place, while constraining wealth. Keynes does not lambast workers for wanting to escape the present, profoundly dysfunctional economy, he is on their side.

References

Clements, R. V. (1961) British Trade unions and popular political economy 1850 – 1875. Economic History Review.

Kahn, Richard E. (1984) The Making of The General Theory, Cambridge University Press.

Lavoie, Marc and Engelbert Stockhammer (2013) Wage-led Growth: An Equitable Strategy for Economic Recovery, Palgrave Macmillan and the International Labour Office.

Marx, Karl (1976) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, Penguin Books in association with New Left Review.

Pelling, Henry (1963) A History of British Trade Unionism, Penguin Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth

Ricardo, David (1817) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.  

Tily, Geoff (2010 [2006]) Keynes Betrayed, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Trades Unions Advisory Committee (2022) ‘Framing the Recovery: Pathways for a World in Transition’, submitted and presented to the OECD Liaison Committee with Non-Governmental Organisations, 21 February 2022: https://tuac.org/news/oecd-tuac-liaison-committee-meeting-policies-for-framing-the-recovery-en-fr/

TUC (1968) The History of the T.U.C. 1868-1968 A Pictorial Survey of a Social Revolution

TUC (2018) A future that works for working people: https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/future-works-working-people

[1] Many thanks to my colleague Rob Maisey for helping further to bridge between Keynes and left.

[2] See the report ‘Framing the Recovery: Pathways for a World in Transition’ submitted and presented to the OECD liaison Committee in February 2022

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The Bank of England’s new chief economist, Huw Pill, gave his first interview in the job to the Financial Times a few days ago. It will do little to confirm the fears of those of us think, at the worst possible moment, the Bank is about to lurch into a round of interest rate rises on the back of inflation fears.

The focus has been on his comments about the short-term outlook, noting that forecasts suggest it will reach 5% over the next year or so. This, claims Pill, is “very uncomfortable” for a central bank with a target for inflation of 2%. True – but an indicator of the weakness of the Bank’s inflation mandate, drafted 24 years ago in a very different world. As the previous Bank governor, Mark Carney, demonstrated, in practice a central bank has significant discretion over its interpretation. The principle of discretion is built in to the Bank’s operations, with the governor merely having to explain, in a formal letter to the Treasury, why the Bank was missing its inflation target should it do so. (This relative autonomy is, after all, the point of saying the Bank is “independent”.) Under current circumstances, with inflation very obviously driven by supply-side shocks, there is no reason for the Bank to be expected to hit its target.

More concerning, however, were Pill’s comments about his “mentor”, first chief economist at the European Central Bank, Otmar Issing. Issing was (and is) a notorious inflation hawk, acting as one of the leading academic advocates for the high interest, tight money policies of the 1970s and 1980s that were crucial to securing the neoliberal turn against post-war Keynesianism. As central banks like Germany’s Bundesbank, the Bank of England and, especially, the Federal Reserve drove up interest rates, supposedly with the aim of targeting inflation, businesses failed and millions were pushed into unemployment.

Issing himself joined the board of the Bundesbank in 1990, as the reunification of Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall gathered pace. The same high-interest, tight money approach by the Bundesbank, pushed by Issing, helped bring devastation to the former East Germany, as factories closed under the lash of an overvalued deutschmark and skyrocketing borrowing costs. Ratcheting up the interest rate, supposedly to cope with inflationary pressures and rising budget deficits, saw East German unemployment peak in 1992 at around 15% – up from scarcely 1% a few years earlier.

Issing later brought the same approach to the ECB where he pushed for a similarly “sound money” approach to designing the euro – this time, attempting to hitch the entirety of the Eurozone on to a monetary policy designed around the preferences of the richest parts of its largest economy. When the Great Financial Crisis erupted over 2007-8, the ECB’s brutal enforcement of its tight money policies under its President, Jean-Claude Trichet, helped push southern Europe into a devastating recession.

Pill himself makes clear that he believes the primary focus of the Bank of England should also be “price stability”. After a number of years in which central bankers, including those at the Bank of England, have recognised that a central banks’ footprint is necessarily larger than just controlling inflation – including, for example, recognising that environmental instability also hurts financial stability, and so central banks must take account of the environment – this looks like a real step backwards.

Facing a spike in prices as a result, primarily, of environmental instability – including the impact of covid-19 – there could surely be no worse time to back away from the Bank’s welcome and growing focus on environmental issues, whilst at the same time threatening to drive up interest rates. Increasing the Bank’s base rate won’t deliver more gas, or grow more food, or end the semiconductor shortage; but it will make it harder for companies to finance themselves, and risk rising unemployment here in Britain.

The Bank of England has an unhappy history of lurching back to monetary orthodoxy at the worst possible time: the disastrous 1925 return to the Gold Standard is the outstanding example, resulting in an immediate fall in exports and rise in unemployment as the pound was overvalued. If that return to orthodoxy happens now – if the Bank starts pushing up rates in the belief this will restrain inflation – future students of economic history may well have cause to view it in the same light.

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An interesting debate was opened by Labour’s MP for Neath, Christina Rees, in Parliament’s Westminster Hall last week on Italy’s “Marcora Law”. This is the legislation introduced there in 1985 to allow workers’ threatened with redundancy the option of exercising a right to purchase the company. Two government-administered funds provide the loan capital needed to the workers, and the law has been credited with saving 13,000 jobs in the years after the financial crisis.

There are two points to note here. First, although co-operative and worker ownership sector in the UK is a fraction of those in Europe and North America, it has been growing rapidly in the last few years, helped along by some recent changes to legislation. 250 new employee-owned business have been established since 2019, taking the total to 720 across the UK: a fraction of the 2m or so registered businesses in the UK, but including at least one very large employer, John Lewis Partnership, and with notable growth in manufacturing firms in particular.

Second, there is a potential here for a government outside the EU to do something radical with this. The original Marcora Law provided for significant government support to those wanting to move a threatened firm into employee ownership, with the Italian state offering to put in up to three times as much additional start up capital as the workers. The European Commission ruled that this was in breach of EU competition law, handing (in its view) an unfair advantage to worker-owned businesses relative to more conventional ownership. But the reality is that this was a clash of two very different conceptions of what a business is. The Commission took (and takes) a pure neoliberal view: that a business is there to benefit its shareholders only, and any one kind of shareholder – someone’s granny with share certificates; your ISA; Black Rock – is much the same as any other. There is, in this view, no case for offering cheap loans to any one type of business over another, solely on the basis of its form of ownership.

That, of course, radically reduces the appeal of worker ownership, and opens up the standard neoliberal objection. If you are employed by a company, you are exposed only to one kind of risk – that the business could fail, and you lose your job. But if you are not only an employee, but a shareholder in the company, you face two kinds of risk: if the business fails, you lose your job – and also whatever capital you have invested. It’s this double risk that tends to weigh heavily against worker buyouts, particularly where employees also face having to borrow money at standard commercial rates.

But there is another way to view a business. Instead of seeing a firm as operating solely for the benefit of its shareholders, we could view it as a social institution in its own right: that whatever a business does includes not only the profit it makes, but the quantity and quality of the work it generates, its impact – good or ill – on the environment, the other businesses and employment it sustains through its purchases, and so on. The evidence that worker ownership performs better on these broader measures of successes is clear: worker-owned firms tend to be more productive, tend to create and sustain more and better jobs, and tend to act as better stewards for the environment.

In this view of a firm as a social institution, government could become a necessary partner, acting as guardian of the broader interests of society alongside those of the workers and any additional shareholders. It would be natural for this additional partner to also take a stake and offer support to a company working in this way. This would be a breach of the neoliberal conception of the company, but would be far closer to the actual

Neoliberalism in law

United Kingdom company law doesn’t think like this. The last major change was the Companies Act 2006, enacted by the Labour government, which did create a weak requirement for directors to “have regard to” environmental and social impacts, but left the basics of shareholder supremacy in place, turning existing common law practice into hard legislation. And for as long as the UK was in the EU, this neoliberal bias reinforced by the EU’s own strict laws and regulations around competition and ownership. Steering around them was possible, but would be an additional hurdle for an economy like the UK if it sought to significantly boost worker ownership.

But outside of the EU, and now subject only to the loose constraints of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, a UK government has more freedom to intervene in the domestic economy. Support for worker ownership could be radically improved, and with the option for further support for specific areas and regions of the country. Cheap capital could be provided at scale for employee ownership schemes; and the opportunity for major expansion is there, too, with potentially thousands of viable small businesses facing closure or sale as their baby-boomer owners approach retirement: nearly two-thirds of UK small business owners are over 50, and two-thirds of them have no succession plan for their businesses. It’s the sort of thing that might appeal to the supposedly “Brexity Hezza” in No.10, but if the government’s response to Rees is any guide, they’ll let it slip. Time for Labour to seize the moment?

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Jan Toporowski

TO PURCHASE THIS BOOK click here and use AGENDA25 to obtain a 25% discount

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Robert Skidelsky

Will Hutton

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Edited by PEF Chair Patrick Allen and council members Suzanne Konzelmann and Jan Toporowski

Publication Date 29th April 2021. Agenda Publishing

40 years of neoliberalism has failed to provide prosperity or stability to the UK economy. Instead it has led to low growth, turbulence, grotesque inequality , poverty and ill health for millions . This is the outcome of damaging economic polices driven by free market dogma, rentier capitalism and ideology. It’s time for a change.

This book contains 18 essays by PEF council members and academics who outline the essential features of a progressive economy dealing with the five massive challenges of our times to the economy – Covid-19, austerity, Brexit , inequality and climate change.

PEF calls for bold public intervention. Shrinking the state and weakening our public institutions has undermined social and community resilience and promoted an out-of-control, value-sapping and high-inequality model of capitalism. 

The authors say the resources of the state must build a fairer and more dynamic post-Covid society, using a mix of regional and industrial policy and investment to revolutionise our public health, housing and social services. A progressive new society should construct a new income floor and new measures to spread wealth and give everyone an equal stake in the economy. 

The financial crash of 2008 proved that only the state can rescue the economy when all else fails including the biggest banks. Covid has shown how only the state can rescue us from death and the collapse of the economy during a devastating pandemic. Only the state can steer the economy and deliver the investment needed to cope with climate change

The 2008 crash showed the breathtaking incompetence of the private financial sector. Now Covid has once again laid bare the myth than private is best – outsourcing to companies the job of track and trace at a cost of £37bn has so far failed to show any discernible benefit say the Public Accounts Committee.

By contrast, the selfless work of millions of NHS workers and volunteers has delivered one of the most outstanding vaccination programmes which has been the envy of the world. This has been done at modest cost and was only possible with a national health service drawing on the vocational drive of its workers for the common good.

The Biden adminstration is today showing the mighty power of the US State with Biden’s Covid and infrastructure bills. The results are expected to cut child poverty in half. The UK government should follow this lead and bring in new models of public intervention to deliver a pandemic-resistant, green economy which works for all citizens.

For an outline , list of chapters and authors and to order a copy go to this webpage

You can obtain a 25% discount on the cover price by entering code AGENDA25 on the Agenda page here

Launch event on Zoom – Wednesday 19th May 2021 at 11am . Joining details to follow.

The launch will be chaired Miatta Fahnbulleh , CEO of NEF and attended by Ed Miliband, Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy . Martin Sandbu of the FT will attend as commentator.

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